By Desmond Nleya
Beijing is building influence in the region through trade, technology and investment rather than attempting to become its dominant military power.
China’s growing engagement with the Gulf is increasingly visible, but Beijing does not appear to be pursuing the same model of influence that Washington has built over decades.
The distinction matters.
While the United States has established itself as the Gulf’s principal external security partner through military alliances, intelligence cooperation, weapons sales and a significant regional presence, China has followed a different path.
Its strategy is largely economic.
Recent diplomatic exchanges between Beijing and Gulf capitals underline the expanding relationship. Qatar’s Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani has visited China, while senior officials from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have also strengthened engagement with Beijing.
These contacts reflect a broader transformation in the Gulf’s international relationships.
China does not necessarily need to replace the United States to become more influential. It can increase its strategic importance by becoming deeply embedded in the economic systems on which Gulf economies depend.
Beijing does not need another military burden
The United States has spent decades building a security architecture across the Gulf.
American naval forces help protect maritime routes, while Washington maintains defence partnerships, intelligence relationships, military facilities and extensive arms agreements with regional governments.
China has benefited from this arrangement.
The security environment maintained largely by the United States has helped keep Gulf energy flowing to Asian markets, including China. At the same time, Chinese companies have been able to expand their commercial operations without having to assume the enormous costs associated with becoming the region’s principal security provider.
Trying to replicate America’s military role would therefore impose significant financial, political and strategic obligations on Beijing.
There is little evidence that China needs to take on that burden.
Instead, it can pursue influence through areas where it already possesses considerable economic capabilities.
Ports, logistics, telecommunications, manufacturing, renewable energy, electric vehicles and digital infrastructure are becoming important components of China’s Gulf strategy.
Chinese state-owned companies already have interests in major infrastructure projects. COSCO Shipping Ports, for example, holds a controlling stake in the joint venture operating the CSP Abu Dhabi Terminal at Khalifa Port.
Such investments create relationships that can last for decades.
A military deployment can be withdrawn relatively quickly. Economic infrastructure is different.
Ports, factories, telecommunications networks, supply chains and long-term investment agreements can create a web of commercial relationships that becomes increasingly difficult to dismantle.
That is a different kind of strategic power.
The Gulf is playing its own game
The Gulf states are not necessarily choosing China over America.
In many cases, they are choosing both.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar have strong reasons to maintain security and technological relationships with Washington and other Western partners. At the same time, China offers enormous markets, manufacturing capabilities, investment, infrastructure expertise and access to wider Asian supply chains.
For Gulf governments pursuing economic diversification, maintaining multiple strategic partnerships provides an opportunity to reduce dependence on any single external power.
This approach can be understood as strategic hedging.
The objective is not necessarily to abandon one partner for another. It is to create enough relationships to preserve room for manoeuvre.
That approach has become particularly important as regional security risks have demonstrated the potential consequences of excessive dependence on a single security provider, shipping route, technology system or source of capital.
The Gulf’s economic transformation makes this diversification even more significant.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are investing heavily in sectors intended to reduce their reliance on hydrocarbons. Artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, renewable energy, logistics and digital infrastructure are becoming central to their development strategies.
China has something to offer across many of these sectors.
AI could become a new arena of competition
Artificial intelligence illustrates the changing nature of Gulf power.
Saudi Arabia’s HUMAIN and the UAE’s G42 are part of wider efforts to establish the region as a significant player in AI.
But building an AI economy requires far more than software.
It requires computing capacity, data centres, electricity, advanced chips, telecommunications infrastructure, investment and highly skilled workers.
This creates opportunities for international partnerships.
China can potentially contribute to some of these areas through technology, infrastructure, manufacturing and investment. Western countries, meanwhile, possess their own technological and financial advantages.
The Gulf therefore has an incentive to maintain relationships with both sides.
This competition could ultimately give Gulf states greater bargaining power as they seek to attract investment and technology while developing their own domestic capabilities.
Military presence is only one measure of influence
For decades, geopolitical influence has often been measured through military bases, aircraft carriers, troop numbers and defence agreements.
Those factors remain important.
But economic integration can also produce strategic influence.
A country whose companies are deeply connected to another country’s ports, telecommunications systems, supply chains, energy projects and technology infrastructure may have substantial influence without maintaining a large military presence.
This is where China’s Gulf strategy becomes significant.
Beijing does not necessarily need to control the region’s security architecture. It can allow Washington to carry much of that burden while expanding its own economic footprint.
The result is not necessarily a Chinese replacement for American power.
It is a more complicated distribution of influence.
Washington’s challenge is changing
The United States remains deeply embedded in the Gulf.
Its defence relationships, intelligence cooperation, financial institutions, universities, technology companies and diplomatic networks provide Washington with significant influence.
But economic influence is becoming increasingly important.
If Washington wants to maintain its position in the region, military power alone may not be sufficient.
The United States can compete by offering Gulf countries advanced technology, credible financing, investment and industrial partnerships while continuing to provide security cooperation.
The competition does not have to force Gulf states into a binary choice between Washington and Beijing.
For the Gulf governments, maintaining relationships with both powers may itself be part of the strategy.
China, meanwhile, does not have to become the Gulf’s security guarantor to increase its influence.
Its economic model offers another route: build relationships that become sufficiently important that disengagement carries a significant cost.
That may prove to be a more sustainable form of influence than attempting to reproduce America’s military footprint.
The emerging contest in the Gulf, therefore, may not be about who replaces whom.
It may instead be about who becomes sufficiently embedded in the region’s future that their presence can no longer be easily ignored.
